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SPECIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTS:
A CRITIQUE OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING
DANIEL R. MANDELKERi
Competitive bidding for public contracts, a requirement which
dates back at least to the middle of the last century," is at present
common at all levels of government.2 With the many changes
which have been wrought in this country's economy since then,
it should be of interest to examine the various specifications
alleged to be restrictive of free bidding, which are used in adver-
tisements for bids. In reviewing the decisions of courts which
have passed on these specifications it should be possible to de-
termine the effectiveness of competitive bidding in the light of
its professed objects, and its validity as viewed against the pat-
tern of today's social and economic organization.
The starting-place, then, is to determine the object of compet-
itive bidding. Some courts have stated it to be the stimulation
of competition,3 some the prevention of fraud and favoritism in
the awarding of contracts.4 More often than not both objects
t Assistant Professor of Law, Drake Univerity.
1. A competitive bidding provision was first inserted in the New York
City Charter in 1853, Brady v. Mayor, 20 N.Y. 312 (1859). No case has
been found involving a competitive bidding provision of an earlier date.
Competitive bidding for public works has been dated from 1845, The
Contract System in Public Works, 20 The Nation 324 (1875).
2. A recent discussion of the extent of competitive bidding, together
with a summary of statutory and charter provisions in the United States
is contained in JAMES, THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTERESTS IN PUB-
LIC CONTRACTS (1946). The pamphlet discusses several of the problems
raised in this article.
3. City Improvement Co. v. Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 110 Pac. 933 (1910);
Detroit Free Press Co. v. Board of State Auditors, 47 Mich. 135, 10 N.W.
171 (1881); Coller v. Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W.2d 835 (1947);
Weinacht v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J. 330, 70 A.2d 69 (1949).
Sometimes the court adds that the purpose, in addition, is to prevent
monopolies, Stites v. Norton, 125 Ky. 672, 101 S.W. 1189 (1907). Is this
aim best achieved by securing competition for the job at hand? See Cleve-
land Trinidad Paving Company v. Lord, 145 Mo. App. 141, 145, 130 S.W.
371, 372 (1910) ("Encouragement of open competition is corresponding
discouragement to monopoly").
4. Fetters v. Mayor, 72 A.2d 626 (Del. Ch. 1950); Attorney General v.
Public Lighting Commission, 155 Mich. 207, 118 N.W. 935 (1908) (prevent
favoritism, corruption, extravagance and improvidence). Some of these
expressions are difficult to classify. In the case last cited, for example, if
the prevention of extravagance is the aim, isn't that best obtained through
free and unrestricted competition?
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
are stated in the conjunctive, as a double standard. Usually
there is very little discussion of the precise meaning of these
standards, and the two might, at first glance, seem to be some-
what dissimilar. The adoption of the one would appear to re-
quire an examination of the specifications in the light of the
opportunities they present to the public authorities to play fa-
vorites. The other would require an approach from the other
side of the contractual picture, an examination of the specifica-
tions to determine the extent of bidding obtained among the
interested bidders.
Actually, the one goal includes the other. The only way to pre-
vent favoritism is to insure unrestricted competition. If the
specifications are drawn so that no one who desires to bid is ex-
cluded, there is no opportunity for favoritism. As the Iowa
court stated in Miller v. Des Moines:6
When the oportunity to compete is fairly and openly
offered, and contracts are fairly awarded, there is ordinarily
no room for official or private graft at public expense. Butjust in proportion as competition is restricted . . . public
rights are imperiled and public interests are sacrificed.
Another factor is suggested by the Iowa court. Specifications
may be drawn free of objection, but the beneficial results of com-
petitive bidding may be thwarted if the contract is not fairly
awarded. Great latitude is given public authorities in awarding
contracts after the bids are in, and ordinarily the award will not
5. United States v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940);
Inge v. Board of Public Works, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678 (1903); Iowa
Electric Co. v. Cascade, 227 Iowa 480, 288 N.W. 633 (1939); Bennett v.
Emmettsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908); Hillig v. St. Louis, 337
Mo. 291, 85 S.W.2d 91 (1935); Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co. v. Lord 145
Mo. App. 141, 130 S.W. 371 (1910); Best v. Omaha, 138 Neb. 325, 293 k.W.
116 (1940); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. North Bend, 68 Neb. 560, 94 N.W.
537 (1903); Grave v. Fobes, 64 Misc. 130, 118 N.Y. Supp. 1062 (Sup. Ct.
1909); Corcoran v. Philadelphia 363 Pa 606, 70 A.2d 621 (1950). Cf.
Carson Cadillac Corp. v. Birmingham, 232 Ala. 312, 167 So. 794 (1936) (to
secure economy and prevent favoritism); Rankin v. Board of Education,
135 N.J.L. 299, 51 A.2d 194 (1947) (same); Commonwealth v. Zang, 142
Pa. Super. 566, 16 A.2d 741 (1941) (to prevent dishonesty and collusion and
to get materials at best possible price). It would seem that "economy" and
the "best possible price" are the results of price competition. See 10
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 266, 267 (3rd ed. 1950).
6. 143 Iowa 409, 420, 122 N.W. 226, 230 (1909). Accord: Mullen v.
Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945). The Iowa court has else-
where adopted the twofold standard, Iowa Electric Co. v. Cascade, 227 Iowa
480, 288 N.W. 633 (1939). See Note, Municipal Corporation-Competitivo
Bidding-Patented Articles, 12 So. CALM. L. REV. 210 (1939)
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be upset if it was made in good faith.7 The bid lowest in price
need not necessarily be accepted," and courts have refused to up-
set rejection of low bids on grounds which, if inserted in the
specifications, might have been invalid as restrictive of competi-
tion.9
It is not the purpose of this article to examine the problem of
official discretion in making awards. The official, like the buyer
in the market place, ought to have some discretion. It should be
enough that the choices available are the result of competition,
and it may be that this is all that can be obtained. This, at least,
is one inference to be drawn from the Iowa court's statement.
Simply deciding that competition is the aim of bidding re-
quirements is not enough, however. Before the examination of
particular specifications it is necessary to determine what the
courts consider the function and purposes of competition to be.
As a guide for comparison it might be helpful to start first with
a discussion of competition as it is usually conceived by students
of economics.
COMPETITION EXPLINED"O
Competition, in the pure sense of the word, is considered to be
a function of price. If the demand for any given commodity ex-
ceeds the supply, consumers will tend to bid the price up. Higher
prices will attract new producers. As a result, supply will even-
tually overbalance demand, and producers will have to cut
prices in an attempt to attract a larger market. Soon the less
efficient producers will have to drop out, and demand will over-
7. Culpepper v. Moore, 40 So.2d 366 (Fla 1949); Baskett v. Davis, 311
Ky. 13, 223 S.W.2d 168 (1949). See 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIoNs 348 (3rd ed. 1950); Note, 38 L.R.A. (N.s.) 653 (1912).
8. Berghage v. Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 176, 246 N.W. 55 (1933);
Martin Epstein Co. v. City of New York, 100 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
See 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 350 (3rd ed. 1950).
9. Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 68 P.2d 559 (1937) (low bidder non-
union); Gillette v. Peabody, 19 Colo. App. 356, 75 Pac. 18 (1904) (same);
Seventh Day Adventist Publishing Assn. v. Board, 166 Mich. 672, 75 N.W.
95 (1898) (low bidder too far from state capital); Pugh Printing Co. v.
Yeatman, 22 Ohio Cir.Ct.R. 584, 12 Ohio Cir.Dec. 477 (1901) (low bidder
non-union). But cf. Miller v. Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 122 N.W. 226(1909); State v. Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration,
122 La. 677, 48 So. 148 (1909) But see Note, 110 A.L.R. 1406 (1937.) For a
current illustration of this problem see Drive on Pentagon, Business Week,
October 21, 1950, 114.10. The following dicussion is adapted from SA.MUELSoN, ECONOMICS
35-41, 457-463, 491-493 (1st ed. 1948).
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balance supply. Then the cycle will begin again, with an equi-
librium between supply and demand as a theoretical optimum.
Only if there is ideal competition, then, will consumers be able
to buy at the lowest possible prices. If one producer could corner
the market, thereby obtaining complete monopoly, he could raise
the price to maximize his profits to the fullest extent, regardless
of consumer need or demand. Actually, the greater part of eco-
nomic activity today is of a mixed variety, termed monopolistic
competition. Each producer of any particular commodity is large
enough to exercise some control over prices and so is able to in-
crease his prices somewhat without losing any appreciable mar-
ket. As a result, the supply and demand cycle is minimized, and
price competition may be negligible. Competition instead cen-
ters around quality differences emphasized through advertising.
What form of competition do competitive bidding provisions
embody? Whatever inferences can be drawn from judicial ex-
pressions of general purpose seem usually to be in the direction
of price competition.1 Whether or not court decisions, in pas-
sing on specifications, predicate a standard of price competition
is another thing. In examining particular specifications, how-
ever, this standard will be used as a frame of reference.
Before the specifications themselves are discussed, a word
seems to be in order concerning the context in which these cases
are presented. The conflict between bidding requirements and
allegedly restrictive clauses presents itself in many ways. Bid-
ding requirements may be placed in municipal ordinances or
charters, or in state or federal statutes, or may result from
judicial public policy. Although a restrictive clause may be
drawn for a particular contract, it may be written expressly or
impliedly into the advertisement as a result of some ordinance,
statute or charter provision. A myriad of conflict situations is
possible. But if the bidding requirement and the restrictive
clause are of equal dignity, both, for example, contained in
statutes, is a court justified in preferring the restrictive clause
11. Anderson v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, 41 So. 684 (1906); Weiss v. Wood-
bine, 228 Iowa 1, 289 N.W. 469 (1940); Iowa Electric Power Co. v.
Grand Junction, 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136 (1933) ; J. Weinstein Build-
ing Corp. v. Scoville, 141 Misc. 902, 254 N.Y.Supp. 384 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Grace v. Fobes, 64 Misc. 130, 118 N.Y.Supp. 1062 (Sup.Ct. 1909). Contra:
Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S. 261 (1943); Milwau-
kee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N.W. 819 (1916).
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out of deference to legislative intent, without more analysis?
Of course, there may be a clear legislative waiver of competitive
bidding with respect to a particular restrictive clause.-
PROTECTIONIST CLAUSES
Some clauses seem to be aimed at keeping the fruits of the
public contract at home and for that reason may be considered
protectionist. Home may be the city, county, state or even the
nation in which the contract is to be performed.
For example, several cases decided in the early 1900's involved
specifications prohibiting the hiring of aliens, or requiring a
preference for citizens.13 There were dicta from which it might
have been inferred that the provision was invalid only if it in-
creased the actual cost of the work..4 The courts which passed
on the question directly held, without further analysis, that the
clause was invalid because it naturally tended to increase cost,' 5
one court indicating that proof of an actual increase was difficult,
if not impossible.,, Since it has been claimed that alien labor in
competition with native labor tends to drive down the cost of the
latter," the conclusion reached by the courts appears to be
sound. Proof that the cost of any one project has been increased
by excluding alien labor could be made, it would seem, only by
producing aliens enough to get the job done who would testify
that they would work for less than their fellow American citi-
zens, truly an impossible task.
Other social considerations in connection with alien labor have
been ignored by the courts. If aliens will work for less, should
the government sanction their exploitation by contractors for
12. See IOWA CODE §73.2 (1950) (Iowa products preferred).
13. Sometimes aliens who had declared their intentions to become citi-
zens were not excluded, Glover v. People, 201 Ill. 545, 66 N.E. 820 (1903).
The constitutionality of the requirement has been sustained, Crane v. State
of New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
14. City Improvement Co. v. Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 326, 110 Pac. 933, 941
(1910); Treat v. People, 195 IlI. 196, 200, 62 N.E. 891, 892 (1902). See
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932) (concurring opinion
of Straup, J.).
15. Inge v. Board of Public Works, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678 (1903);
Glover v. People, 201 Ill. 545, 66 N.E. 820 (1903). See McChesney v. People,
200 II1. 146, 150, 65 N. E. 626, 627 (1902).
16. McChesney v. People, 200 Ill. 146, 150, 65 N.E. 626, 627 (1902).
17. ABBOTT, HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 288-296(1926). WAITE AND CASSADY, THE CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER
395-400 (2nd ed. 1949);
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government jobs? On the other hand, considering the benevolent
purposes implied in the Displaced Persons Act of 1950,13 allow-
ing increased numbers of refugees to settle in this country,
ought we to exclude aliens from public jobs? If alien printers,
for example, cannot do public printing, they may find it difficult
to get work at all, since prospective employers, by hiring them,
would disqualify themselves from bidding for public jobs. Per-
haps employment of aliens can be allowed and exploitation pre-
vented if other safeguards are adopted, minimum wage laws,
for example. But if it is a fact that excluding aliens does in-
crease the cost, should not the inquiry end there, the competitive
bidding requirement having been satisfied? An examination of
judicial treatment of other clauses may provide an answer.
Similar to clauses excluding aliens are those requiring bidders
to "buy local." For example, specifications for a municipal con-
tract may require them to use the products of the state where
the work is to be done, or to do all the work in that state, whether
or not some or all of it could be done more cheaply elsewhere.
Similar in nature are clauses requiring the use of local labor."0
Sometimes the bidders may be restricted to the particular mu-
nicipality.
Most courts which have passed on clauses of this type have
held them valid unless it could be shown that they actually in-
creased the cost,2 0 although this was proved in only two cases.21
18. 62 STAT. 1009 (1948), 50 U.S.C.APP. §§1951 et seq. (Supp. 1949), as
amended 50 U.S.C.Arp. §§ 1951 et seq. (Supp. 1951). See Sen.Rep. No. 950,
80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), printed in U.S. Code Congressional Service,
80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2028.
19. The requirement may amount only to a preference if outside labor
and materials can be utilized when nothing is available locally, Bohn v.
Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932). The federal statutes re-
quire a preference for United States products, 47 STAT. 1520 (1933), 41
U.S.C. §§10a-c (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 1024 (1949), 41 U.S.C. §10d(Supp. 1950).20. St. John v. King, 130 Cal.App. 356, 20 P.2d 123 (1933); Ebbeson v.
Board of Public Education, 18 Del.Ch. 37, 156 Atl. 286 (Ch. 1931); Diver
v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905); Allen v.
Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926 (1905); Pasche v. South St. Joseph
Town-site Co., 190 S.W. 30 (1916); St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co.
v. Frost, 90 Mo.App. 677 (1901); St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co. v.
Von Versen, 81 Mo.App. 519 (1899); Kingston Bituminous Products Co.
v. Trenton, 134 N.J.L. 389 48 A.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Taylor v. Phila-delphia, 261 Pa. 458, 104 Atl. 766 (1918). Cf. Daugherty v. Folk 70 Ohio
App. 304, 46 N.E.2d 307 (1941) (clause attacked as indefinite); bunleavy
v. City of Coatesville, 4 Chest. 262 (Pa., Common Pleas 1932). Se Bohn
v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1933) (concurring opinion of
Straup, J.).
21. St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co. v. Von Versen, 81 Mo.App. 519(1899) ; Taylor v. Philadelphia, 261 Pa. 458, 104 AtI. 766 (1918).
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There have been some judicial expressions from which could be
drawn an inference, admittedly tenuous, that the clause is not
compatible with competitive bidding irrespective of actual ef-
fect on cost.22
Again the obstacles to proof of actual increase in cost seem
insurmountable. In one of the cases proof was ready-made be-
cause the bidders were required to indicate the amount that
would be deducted if the work in question were done outside the
municipality involved. Otherwise the complainant would have
the expense of securing effective testimony from outside the
area involved.
Aside from these objections, clauses of this type, as applied
to non-local products and services, would seem to arbitrarily
exclude many producers and thus, by limiting the number of
producers in competition, create an artificial situation conducive
to monopolistic competition, with its ultimate minimizations of
price competition. Even if only the materials cost were to be
affected, part of the public contract, at least, would be subject
to diminished competition. Since these effects would not evi-
dence themselves until after a court-sanctioned "buy local"
clause had been in effect for a considerable time, it may in fact
be impossible to show proof of increased cost in the test case.
By requiring such proof the courts seem to miss the point.
As for local labor clauses, they would seem to inhibit price
competition only to the extent that they require a period of resi-
dency, in addition to residency itself, as a prerequisite to ob-
taining public work.23 In that case they would tend to exclude
the migratory workers, who ordinarily exercise a depressing
effect on the labor market.24 Excluding migratory workers from
public jobs would thus tend to minimize the competition for the
22. Ebbeson v. Board of Public Education, 18 Del.Ch. 37, 156 At. 286(Ch. 1931); Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542(1926). Cf. State v. Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigra-
tion, 122 La. 677, 48 So. 148 (1909) (refusal of award to low bidder because
too far away from place where work to be performed; courts upsets on
grounds that this would restrict bidding to the given locality only).
23. See Capo v. Kane, 28 Pa.D.&C. 535 (Common Pleas 1937) (ninety
days). The migratory worker cannot settle down, even for a short period
of time, to get residency, since without work he and his family cannot eat.
24. Since migratory workers have a lower standard of living, they can
afford to work for less. See WAITE AND CASSADY, THE CONSUAIMR AND THE
ECONOMIC ORDza 395-400 (2nd ed. 1949).
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labor part of the contract. Removing the ban, however, while
it might decrease the cost, would sanction their exploitation. On
the other hand, assuming other adequate safeguards, such as
minimum wage laws, should any one community be entitled to
isolate itself from a problem which is really a concern of the
national community as a whole?2,
Once more, considerations other than the maintenance of
price competition have intruded themselves. Two cases, in fact,
predicated rejection or acceptance of this type of clause, at least
in part, on grounds unrelated to price competition. The test
seemed to be rather whether the clause in question could reason-
ably have been considered an aid to the quality of the work per-
formed.2 c
WELFARE CLAUSES
Some clauses inserted in the specifications deal with the wel-
fare of the individuals who work on or bid for public contracts.
Typical of clauses of this type are minimum wages, maximum
hours and "Union Only" clauses.
Courts are divided on the validity of minimum wage and maxi-
mum hours clauses. Several theories have been advanced by
courts which have held these clauses invalid. One explanation is
that such requirements remove an item of the contract from
competition. 27 Under this approach no proof of actual increase
of cost is required.
25. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), which held invalid
on constitutional grounds a California statute making it a crime to assist
a nonresident "indigent person" in entering the state. The law was aimed
at the migrant invasion engendered by drought and depression.
In striking down the law the Court quoted from Mr. Justice Cardozo:
"The Constitution... was founded upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run pros-
perity and salvation are in union and not division," Baldwin v. Seelig, 294
U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
26. In Kingston Bituminous Products Co. v. Trenton, 134 N.J.L. 389,
48 A.2d 197 (Sup.Ct. 1946), the clause required the successful bidder for a
road contract to own or have available for use within the city limits an
asphalt mixing plant. Sustaining the clause against attack the court said
in part that it was not unreasonable since asphalt must be laid at high
temperatures.
Bidding was restricted to local freeholders in Waszen v. Atlaintic City,
1 N.J. 272, 63 A.2d 255 (1949). The court held the clause invalid, comment-
ing that local residents, though not freeholders, were just as efficient. The
same comment could be made about residents as compared with nonresi-
dents. The statement may have been influenced by the fact that the speci-
fications were drawn to exclude all but one favored bidder.
27. State ex rel. Bramley v. Norton, 7 Ohio Dec. 354 (Common Pleas
1897) (wages and hours); Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 31 Atl. 375 (1895)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/4
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Another court, in passing on a minimum wage clause only,
required proof of an actual increase in cost,28 whereas another
held that, even without such proof, an eight-hour clause was in-
valid because it tended naturally to decrease competition. 29 This
latter test was utilized by the Supreme Court of Missouri in
finding a minimum wage clause invalid.30 The decision also
pointed out that no improvement in the quality of the work re-
sulted from a clause of this type,3' the court not recognizing the
departure from the price competition standard implicit in the
latter statement.
However, the Missouri Supreme Court has upheld a maximum
hours clause on the ground that the ordinance requiring it was
valid, and that therefore it was a proper basis for bidding. The
court also commented that because the workers were not paid
on a daily basis, the clause did not increase the cost of the work.32
Eight-hour clauses have been sustained elsewhere on the former
theory.31
In other cases the courts have recognized that wages and hours
clauses increased the cost of public work, but have sustained
them on other grounds. Some of these involved depression relief
public works projects financed in part with government funds,
(wages only). In the Felix case the requirement was included by specifica-
tion and the court hinted that a different answer might have been reached
had it been required by ordinance. It is hard to see why, since the com-
petitive bidding requirement was statutory, unless the court places more
weight on a legislative rather than a bureaucratic policy division. In the
Norton case the fact that the requirement was contained in a municipal
ordinance did not save the day.
28. Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash. 589, 124 Pac. 121 (1912) (wages). See
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932) (concurring opinion
of Straup, J.).
29. Glover v. People, 201 Ill. 545, 66 N.E. 820 (1903). See McChesney
v. People, 200 Ill. 146, 150, 65 N.E. 626, 627 (1902). An Illinois state mini-
mum wage law was declared invalid on similar grounds, Reid v. Smith, 375
Ill. 147, 30 N.E.2d 908 (1940). No competitive bidding provision was in-
volved, the court apparently holding that the statute would lead to a waste
of public funds.
30. Hillig v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291, 85 S.W.2d 91 (1935).
31. For a similar comment with reference to a minimum wage clause see
the concurring opinion of Straup, J. in Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah
121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932).
32. Curtice v. Schmidt, 202 Mo. 703, 101 S.W. 61 (1907). A lower
Missouri court based its decision sustaining an identical clause solely on
the last argument, St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co. v. Frost, 90 Mo.
App. 677 (1901).
33. Norris v. Lawton, 47 Okla. 213, 148 Pac. 123 (1915) (court felt that
requirement might increase cost if workers paid by daily rate). Cf. Gamma
Alpha Building Assn. v. City of Eugene, 94 Ore. 80, 184 Pac. 973 (same
holding, but no objection made on competitive bidding grounds).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the clauses being required by the federal agency in question.3'
Construction of an electrical plant by a municipality was in-
volved in one of these cases, and the Iowa Supreme Court ad-
mitted that the minimum wage requirement under attack would
tend to increase the cost of the work. This was held to be no
objection, since the federal grant was twice the entire labor cost
of the project including the increase resulting from the require-
ment.35 As the grant was not an absolute sum but only a per-
centage of the total cost, it would seem that a portion of the in-
creased cost resulting from the minimum wage provision would
have to be borne by the municipality. That the federal grant
was more than twice the labor cost would seem to be irrelevant
unless the court felt that cost was a relative matter, and that
the locality would be worse off without the grant.
Pennsylvania had previously held a minimum wage provision
incompatible with competitive bidding,3 but, when faced with a
wages and hours requirement in a situation similar to that in the
Iowa case just discussed, it reached an opposite result.3 It based
its holding on a statute which authorized municipal corporations
to accept grants from the federal government on such terms as
were deemed necessary. Wage and hour provisions were consid-
ered to be necessary terms. In effect the court held that this
statute was a waiver of the competitive bidding statute. The
evidence as to legislative intent does not convince. At best there
was a conflict between the two statutes which the court failed to
resolve.38
34. If the court were to invalidate the contract in this situation it would
place itself in, the unenviable position of refusing much-needed federal aid.
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Capo v. Kane,
28 Pa.D.&C. 535 (Common Pleas 1937).
35. Iowa Electric Co. v. Cascade, 227 Iowa 480, 288 N.W. 633 (1939).
For a similar holding, in a case not involving a competitive bidding require-
ment see Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. Kennett, 348 Mo. 1108, 156
S.W.2d 913 (1941).
36. See note 27 supra.
37. Campbell v. School District, 328 Pa. 197, 195 Atl. 53 (1937). The
same conclusion was reached with reference to a similar agreement with
the federal government aimed at giving unemployment relief. It contained
minimum wage, citizen preference and other similar clauses, including one
designed to maximize the use of hand labor, Tranter v. Alleghany County,
316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).
38. Cf. Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N.W. 704, explained on re-
hearing 146 N.W. 997 (1914).
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In another similar case the Kentucky court simply decided,
without explanation, that to hold the wages and hours require-
ment invalid was contrary to the purpose of the competitive
bidding act. The court seemed also to be influenced by state
statutes allowing municipalities to accept federal aid.39
The Wisconsin court, in cases decided before the recent depres-
sion, also admitted that wages and hours requirements increased
the cost of public work.40 But the court explicitly rejected the
price competition standard, holding that the purpose of the com-
petitive bidding requirement was not frustrated, although the
effect of the specifications was to prevent the work from being
done at the lowest possible cost. It was competent for the local-
ity to prefer a higher rather than a lower grade of labor, the de-
cided implication being that better work was the result of a
higher wage rate.
Without an attempt to harmonize the conflicting decisions in
this area, it would appear that if the price competition standard
is adhered to, a minimum wage provision at least is incompatible
with competitive bidding. Price competition is impossible with
respect to an item of the contract if a floor is placed under its
price, and that is what a minimum wage provision does. Courts
which take this view appear to be on sound ground, and any
discussion of actual or possible effect on cost seems irrelevant.4
With the price competition standard as a guide, the maximum
hours question is more difficult. However, the distinction at-
tempted by the Missouri court, upholding the hours clause
while striking down the wages provision, does not seem tenable
on closer inspection. The hours clauses involved in these cases
39. Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937).
40. Wagner v. Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 192 N.W. 994 (1923), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 585 (1924) ; Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N.W.
819 (1916.) For similar holdings see Wilson v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 560, 139
S.E. 148 (1927) (dissenting opinion, competitive bidding not involved);
Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. Kennett, 348 Mo. 1108, 156 S.W.2d
913 (1941) (competitive bidding not involved); Dougherty v. Folk, 70
Ohio App. 304, 46 N.E.2d 307 (1941) (clause attacked as indefinite).
41. For a discussion of the effects of the federal statutes requiring
minimum wages and maximum hours see Ballaine, How Government Pur-
chasing Procedures Strengthen Monopoly Elements, 51 JouRxAL OF POLITI-
CAL EcoNoMY 538, 542-544 (1943).
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were eight-hour clauses, and the reduction in hours they bring
about does not ordinarily result in a corresponding reduction in
pay.42 For this reason a clause of this type would tend to bring
about an increase in prices. On this analysis, which, as indicated,
has received some judicial acceptance, the clause would be incom-
patible with competitive bidding.
Whatever the explanations advanced by the decisions sus-
taining clauses of this type, it would seem that such a conclusion
could be reached only if the price competition standard is aban-
doned. This was the approach adopted by the Wisconsin court,
and the standard substituted required that the clause be found
to have improved the quality of the work. Here, also, larger con-
siderations are involved.
Clauses of this type were classified as welfare clauses because
they advanced the standard of living of workers employed on
public jobs. As a result, do benefits redound to the community as
a whole which are more important than securing the job at hand
at the lowest possible cost? An examination of clauses requiring
the exclusive use of union labor on public works may provide an
answer to this question.
Several courts, at the turn of and in the early years of this
century, held such clauses invalid. One court did so on the
ground that the provision tended to increase cost.43 It also stated
that union membership was no indication of increased compe-
tency, thereby implying a standard more concerned with quality
than with price. Other courts held, without discussion, that the
clause in question created a monopoly in a single class and re-
stricted competition.4"
42. STEIN, DAVIS, BERAIAN, MACDONALD, DAVID, RAUSHENBUSH, AND
WARNS, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AmERICA 92-94 (1940).
43. Elliott v. Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Dist. 455 (Common Pleas 1897).
44. Neal Publishing Co. v. Rolph, 169 Cal. 190, 146 Pac. 659 (1915)
(union labor requirement "inconsistent" with competitive bidding); Lewis
v. Board, 139 Mich. 306, 102 N.W. 756 (1905); Marshall & Bruce Co. v.
Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815 (1903). This seems to be the import
of the rather confusing opinion in Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N.W.
704, explained on reheaTing, 146 N.W. 997 (1914) (clause excludes common
labor). See State ex rel. Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Toole, 26 Mont.
22, 34, 66 Pac. 496, 501 (1901).
For similar statements in cases not involving competitive bidding re-
quirements see Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S.E. 932 (1900); Adams
v. Brenan, 177 Ill. 194, 52 N.E. 314 (1898); State v. Mayor, 66 N.J.L. 129,
48 Atl. 589 (1901); People ex rel. John Single Paper Co. v. Edgeomb, 112
App.Div. 604, 98 N.Y.Supp. 965 (4th Dept. 1906).
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If price competition is the aim of competitive bidding, no doubt
a "Union Only" clause is invalid. It restricts competition be-
cause non-union laborers are not allowed to compete for the
labor item of the contract. A more basic objection is that the
clause in effect puts a floor under the price of wages and so has
the same effect as a minimum wage provision. All employers
hiring union labor must adhere to the union scale, which in
effect, is a minimum wage.
More recently, however, a New York supreme court, in Amal-
ithone Realty Co. v. City of New York,45 held such a provision
valid. The basis of its opinion is apparent from the following
quotation:
Even though the immediate cost in dollars and cents to
the city may be higher than the cost of sweatshop products,
we have now come to recognize the greater ultimate cost to
the people as a whole which results from low wages, over-
long hours and unsanitary working conditions. The presence
of the union label may reasonably be considered as a fair as-
surance that the products have been manufactured under
conditions in accord with our present-day social conscious-
ness. In these days, when much of the effort of government
is directed toward securing decent standards of pay and work
for labor ... it would certainly be strange to say that the
city or state itself may not insist that its own products be
made according to fair standards. 6
Minimum wage and maximum hours clauses may be similarly
justified.47
45. 162 Misc. 715, 295 N.Y.Supp. 423 (Sup.Ct. 1937); affd., 251 App.Div.
450, 297 N.Y.Supp. 262 (1st Dept. 1937).
46. Id. at 716, 295 N.Y.Supp. at 425. The quoted statement could be
considered dictum to the case, since the question involved was whether a
specification could exclude one union and not another, and not whether
union labor could be specified. The case was approved in Burland Printing
Co. v. La Guardia, 9 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup.Ct. 1938).
47. A similar approach was taken by a Pennsylvania trial court in
Capo v. Kane, 28 Pa.D.&.C. 535 (Common Pleas 1937). Involved was a
depression period contract providing for grants from the federal govern-
ment for a local works project. Minimum wages, maximum hours, and
preference to persons on relief, especially those who had lived in the
state for ninety days, were among the requirements in the specifications.
Though the minimum wage clause had specifically been declared invalid by
the state supreme court, see note 27, suprn, the contract was upheld on
grounds of "public policy." "Since the primary purpose was to put men to
work, the Federal Government wisely retained a certain control over the
employment of the men required in order to see that this object was accom-
plished." Id. at 546.
For an unfavorable decision dealing with similar clauses see Bohn v.
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A similar approach was taken by the United States Supreme
Court in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission.48 A federal
statute required competitive bidding for milk, the product in
question. The price of milk was governed by a Pennsylvania
minimum price law aimed at stabilizing the market in the inter-
est of milk producers. In finding the Pennsylvania law not in-
consistent with the federal statute, the court explicitly rejected
cost as the only consideration in the letting of government con-
tracts. Reference was made to other federal statutes requiring
the inclusion of "Buy American," eight hour, anti-child labor
and similar clauses which bring about an increase in cost. But
the Court pointed out:
Congress has regarded the field of public contracts as one
over which to exercise its supervisory legislative powers in
safeguarding interests which may conflict with the needs of
the government viewed solely as purchaser.4 1
Justice Douglas dissented ° on the ground that it was the plain
policy of the competitive bidding statute to secure to the govern-
ment the benefits of price competition. From that approach the
Pennsylvania statute would have to give way, since competition
is hardly obtainable when a floor is placed under prices.
CLAUSES RELATING TO THE QUALITY OF THE JOB AND THE
EFFICIENCY OF ITS EXECUTION
While some courts have treated some of the clauses already
discussed as having a bearing on the quality or efficiency of the
work, for the most part they have been considered to embody
other purposes. The group of clauses next to be discussed, how-
ever, fall clearly into the former classification.
When a large project is to be undertaken, it may be advan-
tageous to let the entire work to one contractor. It would appear
that a unit bid of this type would result in lower costs through
Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932) (competitive bidding not
involved).
48. 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
49. Id. at 274. It also found a lack of clear-cut Congressional intent in
the matter as a result of the co-existence, without explanation, of seem-
ingly contradictory statutory provisions.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Murphy felt that the "larger interests"
of the nation as a whole would not suffer from the observance of the Penn-
sylvania requirement, id. at 280, 281.
50. Id. at 282, 283.
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better coordination of the work and mass purchasing. In any
event a better job will probably result when responsibility for
supervising and integrating the work is placed in one concern.
Unit bidding may restrict competition, however, since it would
exclude those smaller concerns which could not afford to bid on
the entire job. One court held that in the absence of evidence
that competition was restricted, unit bidding was a matter for
the contracting authority's discretion'1 It added that requiring
bidding on a part rather than on the whole might be equally as
exclusive of the larger contractors. This approach appears
sound. Another court placed no limits on the locality's discre-
tion in the matter.52
To expedite financing of a public project the specifications
may require the successful bidder to take his compensation in
bonds of the locality. One court criticized the provision on the
grounds that it confined the bidding to persons of substantial
means. If the successful bidder was not in a favorable financial
position, the court pointed out, it would have to sell the bonds
immediately, perhaps at a discount, and this would raise the
amount of its bid.53 A bidder of means, on the other hand, could
hold the bonds until a more favorable time for disposal. Yet the
court indicated it would sustain the contract unless it could be
proved that the specification actually increased the cost.
Two other courts found the provision valid, one on the theory
51. Davies v. Madelia, 205 Minn. 526, 287 N.W. 1 (1939). Cf. Peeples v.
Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S.E. 677 (1896) (award to print several volumes of
the official state reports sustained against claim of abuse of discretion);
Detroit Free Press Co. v. Board of State Auditors, 47 Mich. 135, 10 N.W.
171 (1881) (unrelated items of printing specified, all may be awarded to
one printer).
Absent competitive bidding objections, calling for an entire bid has gen-
erally been sustained, Note, 123 A.L.R. 577 (1939).
52. Interstate Power Co. v. McGregor, 230 Iowa 42, 296 N.W. 770(1941). Under the statute involved the contract need not have been let to
the lowest bidder. However, the Iowa court has held that the statute does
require competitive bidding, Iowa Electric Co. v. Cascade, 227 Iowa 480,
288 N.W. 633 (1939).
53. Ledwith v. City of Lincoln, 110 Neb. 425, 193 N.W. 763 (1923). The
point was reserved in Rice v. Board of Trustees, 107 Cal. 398, 40
Pac. 551 (1895) (clause not shown to have increased the cost or deterred
any bidders).
In Hirsch v. Mayor, 141 Miss. 827, 105 So. 492 (1924) the specifications
provided that the city could withhold payment of the contract price for
from six to nine months after completion. The court held that this clause
did not destroy competition since it was for the city's advantage. The de-
cision would seem to be open to the same objections as those justifying
payment in bonds of the locality.
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that it was simply an indication of financial responsibility, a re-
quirement which the contracting authority had the right to insist
onA' In the other case the provision was required by statute, and
the court apparently considered this to be a waiver of the com-
petitive bidding requirement, which was also statutory."
The effect of the clause would in fact appear to be the exclu-
sion of newcomers and of poorer bidders since the resulting in-
crease in their bids would put them out of the running. If they
tried to cut their bids to meet competition, the job might be too
unprofitable. Spared the trouble of meeting new and possibly
more virile competition, older firms may safely be able to raise
prices. Conditions conducive to monopolistic competition may
result.
Proof of an actual increase in cost would not seem necessary
and would be difficult, as it would involve an appraisal of such
intangibles as the condition of the market for the bonds in ques-
tion and the financial situation of each actual and prospective
bidder. Although the requirement has been defended as a guar-
antee of responsibility, it is to be questioned whether this justi-
fication should be accepted. It seems rather to be an aid to the
financing of the project. Should this gain to the locality outweigh
the desirability of price competition?
Another technique of insuring responsible work is to require
the bidders to prequalify with respect to such matters as fitness
of product, satisfactory previous experience and adequate finan-
cial resources. Prequalification has been sustained as a reason-
able method of excluding the irresponsible and the inferior."
54. Shields v. Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913 (1923). Cf. Davies v.
Madelia, 205 Minn. 526, 287 N.W. 1 (1939) (contractor to be paid from net
earnings of plant; upheld as reasonable).
55. Weiss v. Woodbine, 229 Iowa 978, 295 N.W. 873 (1941).
56. United States v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940)(bidders must have passed inspection test within one month of bidding);
Berghoffen v. City of New York, 31 Misc. 205, 64 N.Y.Supp. 1082 (Sup. Ct.
1900) (previous experience) ; Eckerle v. Ferris, 175 Okla. 107, 51 P.2d 766(1935) (use test); Corcoran v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 606, 70 A.2d 621(1950) ; Harris v. Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 473, 149 At. 722 (1930) ; Dunleavy
v. City of Coatesville, 4 Chest. 262 (Pa. Common Pleas 1932). Cf. Reders-
heimer v. Flower, 52 La.Ann. 2089, 28 So. 299 (1900) (five-year use test
for paving surface invalid in light of two-year use test for materials
and evidence indicating five-year period too long); Knowles v. City of New
York, 176 N.Y. 430, 68 N.E. 860 (1903) (previous experience, competitive
bidding not involved); J. Weinstein Building Corp. v. Scoville, 141 Misc.
902, 254 N.Y.Supp. 384 (Sup.Ct. 1931) (financial prequalification restric-
tive of competition unless authorized by statute).
Where the effect of prequalification is to restrict the bidding to one
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Clauses of this type cannot be justified on the theory that the
contracting authority can reject a bid on the same grounds
after the bids are in.57 Exclusion from the bidding itself for
these reasons does not amount to the same thing. Such a scheme
will definitely place the less wealthy and the newcomers at a
disadvantage. If the scheme were rigidly executed it would ex-
clude them from bidding altogether with the reduction in com-
petition and upward pull in price that have already been de-
scribed.5
Another requirement aimed at getting good quality is that the
contractor must guarantee his work for a period of time.59 These
provisions have been sustained, even though their inclusion
would probably force the contractor to increase his bid. The tax-
payer is receiving something of equivalent value in return, a
promise that the work will be kept in a satisfactory condition
for a period of time and an assurance that the job will be well-
done at the outset.,, Price competition has been sacrificed for
improved quality.
bidder, it has been rejected, Rankin v. Board of Education, 135 N.J.L. 299,
51 A.2d 194 (1947); International Meters v. City of New York, 101 N.Y.S.
2d 208 (Sup.Ct. 1950); Finigan v. Zuber, 156 Misc. 479, 281 N.Y.Supp.
930 (Sup.Ct. 1934).
57. See 10 MCQUmnIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 352, 360, 361 (3rd ed.
1950). For a list of factors to be considered in awarding bids see Rosen-
baum, Tested Criteria for "Lowest Responsible Bidder," American City,
February, 1943, 37.
58. For an exposition of this argument see Boswell, Is Prequalification
of Contractors Necessary and Constitutional, American City, November
1929, 150. For a contrary position see Field, Why Prequalification Should
Be Required of All Bidders on Public Works, American City, April, 1929,
160, and In Defense of the Pre-qualifications of Contractors, American
City, January, 1930, 175.
59. For a recent survey of the use of maintenance guarantees, see
Pavement Maintenance Guarantees, American City, June, 1939, 44.
60. Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905);
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gaar, 115 Ky. 334, 73 S.W. 1106 (1903). In
the latter case the contractor had to maintain a permanent plant in the
city during the guaranty period. This was sustained as a reasonable ad-
junct to the guaranty provision. Since the repair work had to be done
properly and promptly, having the plant available would relieve the city
from the expense of litigation to enforce the guaranty, and the cost of the
plant was held to be small as compared with the amount of the contract.
No figures were given, however. The explanation gives the court away. A
guaranty is a court-enforceable promise. If something is to be required in
addition, it should be justified on its own. The practical effect of requiring
a local plant is to exclude nonresidents.
In some states repairs to a road must come out of the general fund and
cannot be assessed againt the abutting property owners. A guaranty to
make needed repairs for five years and a deposit to secure the guaranty
equal to ten per cent of the contract price was held to violate that rule
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A similar justification can be made for the requirement that
bidders post a performance bond,0' or, what amounts to the same
thing, make a good faith advance deposit by certified check. The
former requirement has not been challenged as restrictive of
bidding. Although the latter has, it has been sustained as rea-
sonable.6 2 Both clauses may tend to exclude new or poorer firms.
A larger bond premium may be required, money may have to be
borrowed to make the advance deposit, and interest has to be
paid on borrowed money. As a result, increased costs may ex-
clude them from competition. Yet a performance bond or ad-
since the result was an increase in the bid, Fehier v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380, 35
S.W. 1125 (1896). However, the equivalence argument was used to sustain
similar clauses in cases involving an application of the above rule, Allen v.
Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926 (1905); Dillingham v. Mayor, 75 S.C.
549, 56 S.E. 381 (1907).
When the contractor is required to guarantee to pay damages for which
he would have been liable in any event the guaranty has been held valid,
Diver v. Keokuk Savings Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905). This
seems to have been the basis for the decision in City Improvement Co. v.
Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 110 Pac. 933 (1910) (bidder to submit bond against loss
from patent infringement suits). Cf. McQuiddy v. Worswick Street Paving
Co., 160 Cal. 9, 116 Pac. 67 (1911) (competitive bidding not involved). No
increase in cost results since the cost of meeting the liability will be in-
cluded in the bid in any event.
When the guaranty relates to damages for which the bidder would not
have been liable a contrary result has been reached, Anderson v. Fuller,
51 Fla. 380, 41 So. 684 (1906). Cf. Stansbury v. Poindexter, 154 Cal. 709,
99 Pac. 182 (1908) (competitive bidding not involved). Since in this case
nothing of benefit to the job in question has been secured, the result seems
correct. If the municipality would have been liable without the guaranty,
responsibility has simply been shifted from the general fund to the funds
earmarked for the particular project, hardly a gain.
61. Requiring a bond for faithful performance is quite common, see
JAMES, THE PROTECTION Op THE PUBLIC INTERESTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS
11 (1946). When the bond requirement is part of the law requiring com-
petitive bidding any objection that bidding has been restricted should be
foreclosed, see City Improvement Co. v. Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 110 Pac. 933(1910).
62. St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co. v. Frost, 90 Mo.App. 677 (1901) ;
State v. Mayor, 42 Atl. 845 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 1899) (cost of improvement$7,995,000, deposit $100,000). The implication is that the requirement would
be unreasonable if the deposit were too high in relation to the cost of the
improvement. Cf. Del Balso Construction Corp. v. Gillespie, 225 App.Div. 42,
232 N.Y.Supp. 261 (1st Dept. 1928), af'd., 250 N.Y. 584, 166 N.E. 333 (1929)(competitive bidding not involved); Helwig v. Gloversville 158 N.Y.Supp.
475 (Sup.Ct. 1916) ($10,000 deposit for $3200 job held to be restrictive of
bidding).
However, in Weiss v. Woodbine, 228 Iowa 1, 289 N.W. 469 (1940) the
cumulative effect of the following provisions was held to be restrictive of
bidding though the court pointed out that each one taken alone would not
be restrictive: only bid on entire project allowed; contractor to be compen-
sated in bonds of locality; contractor to advance $8,000 by certified check
cost of project $115,000. The case is commented on in Comment, Municipal
Corporations-Competitive Bidding on Public Works-Unreasonable Re-
strictions by Several Valid Stipulations, 25 IOWA L. REV. 828 (1940).
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vance deposit is certainly an assurance that the work will be
carefully done, a guarantee of satisfactory quality.
Clauses which increase the cost would seem to be incompatible
with price competition, even though they improve the quality of
the work. This problem is presented most clearly by specifica-
tions dealing with the materials or product to be used. In an
attempt to secure the best that is available, patented articles or
brand-name products marketed by only one manufacturer may
be specified. Courts are divided on the validity of such clauses,3
but whatever the reasoning used by courts that justify them,
such decisions absolutely prohibit price competition. Monopoly
is its very antithesis. Such clauses, where upheld, can best be
classified as a judicial exception to competitive bidding, moti-
vated by a desire to secure the best products obtainable.
At the other extreme, if the specifications are too indefinite,
courts will disapprove them because no ascertainable standard
63. The subject of specifications of patented articles has been treated in
several articles. See Note, Municipal Corporations: Paving Contracts:
Contracts With a Patentee, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 240 (1931); Recent Case,
Municipal Corporations-Letting Contracts to Lowest Bidder 19 MICH.
L.REv. 570 (1921) ; Note, Municipal Contracts for Patented or Proprietary
Paving, 6 MicH.L.REv. 493 (1908).
Brand name articles or limitation to one source. Valid: Springfield v.
Haydon, 216 Ky. 483, 288 S.W. 337 (1926) ; Kingston Bituminous Products
Co. v. Long Branch, 124 N.J.L. 472, 12 A.2d 237 (1940). Invalid: Raynor
v. Conunissioners, 220 N.C. 348, 17 S.E.2d 495 (1941). See 10 MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 304-307 (3rd ed. 1950); Note, 77 A.L.R. 702
(1932).
Sometimes an attempt has been made to specify a standard product of
one concern by so drawing the specifications as to exclude all but the
product desired. In this way the risk involved in naming the product out-
right is sought to be avoided. Courts are divided on the validity of specifi-
cations of this type. Valid: Eckerle v. Ferris, 175 Okla. 107, 51 P.2d 766(1935); Rote v. Bexar County Water Control and Improvement District,
91 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936); Invalid: Grace v. Fobes, 64 Misc.
130, 118 N.Y.Supp. 1062 (Sup.Ct. 1909); Fischer Auto & Service Co. v.
Cincinnati, 16 Nisi Prius n.s. 369, 26 Ohio Dec. 103 (1914).
Specifications of this type are open to the same objection as specifica-
tions of a patented or brand name product. It could be argued that since
the article specified is not patented any concern could produce it at will
and compete in the bidding. Cf. Hopkins v. Hanna, 135 Misc. 750, 239
N.Y.Supp. 489 (Sup.Ct. 1930). This contention was convincingly refuted
in Fischer Auto & Service Co. v. Cincinnati, supra. There a specification
for a police chief's car was drawn so as to exclude all but one particular
make. The court pointed out that while parts could be obtained in the
open market to assemble an identical car it could not enter into commer-
cial competition with a car coming from a plant organized and equipped
solely for its production. Competition was held to be present in name only.
Cf. American La France & Foamite Corp. v. City of New York, 156
Misc. 2, 281 N.Y.Supp. 519 (Sup.Ct. 1935), aff'd., 246 App.Div, 699, 283
N.Y.Supp. 899 (1st Dept. 1935).
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is presented for competitive bidding and the bidders cannot be
sure they are bidding on the same thing."4 Yet if the specifica-
tions are too specific they are always open to the challenge that
they have been drawn to exclude all but one bidder, though he is
not listed by name.6" Where should the line be drawn?
So long as the above objections are not present, most courts
have allowed specification of materials or products on the basis
of quality. There is little agreement, however, as to the circum-
stances under which this may be done. Some of the decisions
seem to place no limit on the discretion of the contracting
authority. 6 Other courts require a stronger showing, that the
specified article be substantially different, 7 or that the specifi-
cation be made in good faith.68 In another case the specification
of a particular product was disallowed in the absence of a clear
showing of its superiority.69
Yet specifications simply describing the product desired with-
out giving details as to quality or make-up have also been sus-
tained.70 These cases involved manufactured items, and it was
64. Bennett v. Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908) ; Hannan
v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372, 107 Pac. 646 (1909); Ricketson v.
Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 591, 81 N.W. 864 (1900). See 10 MCQUILLIN, M UNI-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS 313 (3rd ed. 1950); Note, 30 L.R.A. (N.s.) 214 (1911).
65. International Meters v. City of New York, 101 N.Y.S.2d 208
Sup.Ct. 1950); Gage v. Connor, 142 App.Div. 228, 126 N.Y.Supp. 1041
(4th Dept. 1911).
66. Fox v. Cincinnati, 22 Ohio Law Abstract 290 (Common Pleas 1936).
Cf. Rhodes v. Board of Public Works, 10 Colo.App. 99, 49 Pac. 430 (1897).
See Fischer Auto & Service Co. v. Cincinnati, 16 Nisi Pruis n.s. 369, 377,
378, 26 Ohio Dec. 103, 111 (1914) ; Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla.
372, 391 107 Pac. 646, 654 (1909).
67. dleveland Trinidad Paving Co. v. Lord, 145 Mo.App. 141, 130 S.W.
371 (1910). The court did not seem to require much of a showing that the
specified material was different. Cf. Diamond v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48,
93 N.W. 911 (1903) (specification of one type of asphalt invalid since other
types just as good).
68. Hopkins v. Hanna, 135 Misc. 750, 239 N.Y.Supp. 489 (Sup.Ct. 1930);
Eckerle v. Ferris, 175 Okla. 107, 51 P.2d 766 (1935). Of course, the com-
petitive bidding provision may permit the specification of material by
quality, Rhodes v. Board of Public Works, 10 Colo.App. 99, 49 Pac. 430
(1897).
69. American La France & Foamite Corp. v. City of New York, 156
Misc. 2, 281 N.Y. Supp. 519 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd., 246 App. Div. 699, 283
N.Y. Supp. 899 (1st Dept. 1935). See Hillig v. St Louis 337 Mo. 291, 296,
85 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1935). In Hastings Pavement Co. v. Cromwell, 67 Misc.
212, 124 N.Y. Supp. 388 (Sup.Ct. 1910), aff'd., 143 App. Div. 942, 127
N.Y.Supp. 1124 (2nd Dept. 1911), the court found that a certain type
of pavement could be excluded from the specifications because, on the
facts, it was inadequate for the job to be done.
70. Brutsche v. Coon Rapids, 223 Iowa 487, 272 N.W. 624 (1937) (diesel
engine); Patterson v. Zanesville, 42 Ohio App. 428, 182 N.E. 352 (1932)
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rightly pointed out that detailed specification would be impos-
sible without preferring one or a group of manufacturers over
another.
Under the point of view just discussed, both price competition
and monopolistic or quality competiton would be possible. But
if quality can be specified, both are impossible. This is true
whether quality is specified directly or whether this is achieved
through a clause requiring the bidder to put up a performance
bond, or through a requirement that a minimum wage be paid,
or through any other indirect means.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the avowed purpose of competitive bidding, the de-
cisions fall far short of insuring either price or quality competi-
tion. While consistent patterns of interpretation have often
failed to emerge, nonetheless if "Buy Local," minimum wage
and "Union Only" clauses are sustained, the goal of price com-
petition has not been achieved. And if the quality of the product
is specified, directly or indirectly, monopolistic competition is
not possible.
Interpretations of this type seem inescapable, however. Pure
price competition is impossible, considering the fact, already
noted, that it is not the rule in the major part of modern econ-
omy. Aside from this, the nature of the competitive bidding re-
quirement makes it a less than effective tool to achieve such a
goal. Price-cutting practices of monopolies and near monopolies
to drive out weaker competitors are well-known.- If a giant
firm underbids for a public contract with this end in mind, its
bid would be accepted, all other factors being equal. Courts
generally have not been concerned with the effects of monopo-
listic practices, thereby destroying competition in the long run
by insisting on it for the particular contract at hand.72
(fire alarm box). In Hodgemen v. San Diego, 53 Cal.App.2d 610, 128 P.2d
412 (1942), the court held that competitive bidding for parking meters
could be dispensed with because to specify one type would necessarily ex-
clude the others, all types being patented. It would seem that a bid calling
simply for parking meters would adequately inform the bidders of the
nature of the product called for and would give free rein to quality com-
petition. Cf. Hines v. Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393, 57 N.E.2d 164(1943).
71. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE, 341, 342(1951); WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 5, 6
(TNEC Monograph 21, 1941).
72. It has, in fact, been contended that practices of the federal govern-
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But there are more basic objections. Perhaps a private indi-
vidual may want to take a risk of poorer quality at cheaper cost.
Government cannot afford to do this; it must insist on high
quality.73 For one thing safety and health factors are involved,
especially in school, sewage disposal, road, and similar projects.
For another, the inferior project may have to be replaced. If
the contractor is insolvent, the public treasury must bear the
loss. The resulting financial burden would be intolerable.
It should also be remembered that the role of government
has changed considerably since competitive bidding provisions
were first adopted. Not only has it expanded its activities but
it has grown so in size, as compared with the remainder of the
economy, as to constitute an important economic force capable
of exerting considerable influence.74 It is probably for this rea-
son that government was soon recognized as an effective agency
for the transmittal of desirable social policies."
ment in making purchases through competitive bidding have tended to les-
sen competition and to increase monopoly, Ballaine, How Government Pur-
chasing Procedures Strengthen Monopoly Elements, 51 JOURNAL OF POIaTI-
cAL EcONOmy 538 (1943).
However, in Stites v. Norton, 125 Ky. 672, 101 S.W. 1189 (1907), bids
were asked for a lighting franchise. The purpose was to secure a compet-
itor for a company which already had a similar franchise. It was held per-
missable to exclude the company holding the existing franchise from the
competition for the new one, prevention of monopolies and the encourage-
ment of competition being considered of equal importance with securing
the highest bidder.
While the exclusion of the existing franchise holder from the new com-
petition might result in the new franchise going for a smaller sum than
would otherwise have been the case, in the long run competition between
two companies should benefit the municipality by insuring lower rates. It
is conceivable that the existing franchise holder would have bid up the
new franchise to preserve its monopoly. Attempts to secure competition
in the public utilities field, of course, are now a thing of the past.
73. See Quality, or Price in Public Buying? American City, September,
1938, 5.
74. In 1950 federal, state and local governmental expenditures accounted
for 15% of gross national expenditures, Survey of Current Business,
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, February, 1951, 7. This amounted
to $42,100,000,000 out of a total of $279,800,000,000, id. at 9. Of all new
construction started in 1950, 25% was public, a total of $7,900,000,000 out
of $29,600,000,000, id. at 18.
For an analysis adopting the position that attempts to influence economic
life through the medium of governement purchasing are largely ineffectual
see Denison, The Influence of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act Upon
Labor Conditions, 49 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 225 (1941).
75. What social policies are desirable is another, and debatable, ques-
tion. Competing policies in connection with clauses restricting aliens from
public work, or requiring bidders to "Buy Local," were suggested as illus-
trative of the problems involved.
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To require government contractors to pay a minimum wage
or to recognize the union of its employees is to set the pace for
the rest of the economy. To allow the government to get out of
step with legislative social advance is not only unthinkable on
humanistic grounds, but would undercut the success of these
programs in the private sector of society./ Social policies of
benefit to society as a whole certainly outrank the limited goal
of price competition, especially since it is so difficult to achieve
through the competitive bidding device.
In fact, it can be argued that laws such as minimum price
legislation are an implied waiver of price competition. There
cannot be full competition when a floor is set under an impor-
tant cost of production. But that is just the point. All business
is placed by statute on an equal footing as to one item of cost so
that a more desirable social end can be achieved. These consid-
erations seem to underlie those decisions that sustain require-
ments of this type as against competitive bidding objections, on
broad social grounds.
Considering all these objections, it would seem best to aban-
don the attempt to secure price competition in bidding for pub-
lic contracts. Fraud and favoritism still present a problem, but
it is doubtful if it can be solved by the competitive bidding
device, especially since there is so much room for official dis-
cretion in awarding the contract.7 Official fraud is hard to
prove.
Supposedly, legislative or official determinations as to what these policies
should be represent the popular will. Reliance will have to be placed
on the ballot box to correct those policies that are considered undesirable.
76. A case in point is fair employment practices legislation. Local
ordinances and statutes of this type often require contractors with the city
or state, as the case may be, to insert in their contracts a clause obligating
them not to commit any of the unfair employment practices specified in
the law. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-1205 (Supp. 1951); Chicago Mun. Code,
c. 198.7A §3; Milwaukee Mun. Code, §106-25. Since the commission of a
proscribed practice would constitute a breach of contract this provision is
an effective weapon. Yet under laws of this type equal pay must be given
to minorities, and eradication of any inequalities that were present before
the adoption of the law would tend to increase the cost of the work.
Is fair employment practices legislation incompatible with competitive
bidding for this reason? To hold that it is would result in the enforcement
of one standard of morality for the community at large and another for
the government. The bad example set would certainly weaken the enforce-
ment of the law.
77. Discussion of possible solutions for this problem is beyond the scope
of this article. Prohibiting officials from having an interest in public con-
tracts is one device that has already been attempted. See Bay v. Davidson,
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Advertisements for bids should still be required, so that the
contracting authority will have as wide a field as possible from
which to choose. But no limitations should be placed on specifi-
cations aimed at securing a benefit which appears to redound to
the particular project in mind or to society as a whole.
133 Iowa 688, 111 N.W. 25 (1907); Hill v. Baker, 309 Ky. 514, 218 S.W.2d
24 (1949); Note, 74 A.L.R. 792 (1931).
For details of fraud in public contracts in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century see The Contract System in Publio Works, 20 The Nation
324 (1875). The writer argues that the ultimate elimination of fraud from
public contracts depends primarily on an improved level of morals in gov-
ernment. For interesting tales of more recent vintage see a series of arti-
cles by Kaiser, The $10,000 Gallon of Oil, 155 Atlantic Monthly 17 (1935) ;
The $3,000 Snow Shovel, 155 Atlantic Monthly 182 (1935); Thirty-Eight
Gondolas of Granite, 155 Atlantic Monthly 357 (1935). For an even more
recent statement see JAMFS, THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEESTS IN
PUBLIC CONTRACTS (1946).
Several fraudulent devices and suggestion for their elimination are
discussed in a review of an article by Gillette, Honesty in Public Contract
Work, 33 Engineering Magazine 795 (1907).
For a criticism of competitive bidding from a different approach see
Nimmons, The Evil Effects of Competitive Bidding on Building Contracts,
23 Architectural Record 47 (1908). The author suggests the abandonment
of competitive bidding.
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